The interplay between competition and trust as efficiency-enhancing mechanisms in the private provision of money is studied. With commitment, trust is automatically achieved and competition ensures efficiency. Without commitment, competition plays no role. Trust does play a role but requires a bound on efficiency. Stationary inflation must be non-negative and, therefore, the Friedman rule cannot be achieved. The quality of money can be observed only after its purchasing capacity is realized. In this sense, money is an experience good.
Introduction
The model analyzed is one of currency competition where goods are supplied in per-38 fectly competitive markets, and consumers can buy these goods by using any of a con- large markup is associated with a very low price charged for the use of money. In the 46 limit, as the cost of producing money converges to zero, the equilibrium is efficient 47 regardless of the elasticity of substitution across competing currencies.
48
The Friedman rule condition of zero nominal interest rates implies that inflation 49 will be negative on average, since real interest rates are positive on average. Currency 50 issuers will have to withdraw money from circulation, which means that cash flows will 51 be negative. Even if the total revenues from currency issuance, including the gains 52 from the initial issuance, may be positive, in each period losses will be incurred. In 53 order for this to be an equilibrium, currency issuers must be able to commit to future 54 losses.
55
Without commitment, negative inflation cannot be sustained. But, as it turns 56 out, every stationary positive inflation is an equilibrium outcome, and the degree of 57 substitutability does not affect this characterization. These are the main results of this 58 paper: i) the existence of a bound on efficiency defined by the need to sustain trust; 59 ii) that the bound of efficiency corresponds to inflation being non-negative, and iii) 60 there exists an indeterminacy of equilibria with positive inflation rates and competition 61 playing no role.
62
These results apply to other markets where goods or services must be purchased 63 before their quality can be observed. Those goods are called experience goods. In one sense, money is also an experience good. We can think of the quality of money as 65 the amount of goods that money can buy, which can only be observed ex post. The 66 provision of money and the provision of experience goods seem a priori very differ-67 ent problems (the former being a commitment problem and the latter an information 68 problem), but they are indeed isomorphic regarding the interplay between competition 69 and trust. Although the elasticity of substitution for high-quality goods can be quite 70 high, once the goods have been purchased the elasticity is zero. A supplier who does 71 not take reputation into account, will only consider this elasticity and will not supply 72 high-quality goods or services. In a dynamic economy, firms are concerned with their 73 future market position, so that the need to maintain trust in their products may be 74 enough to discipline them to effectively provide high-quality goods. The mechanism 75 that can sustain high quality is trust, not competition. This analogy is discussed in 76 section 6.
77
The issue of currency competition has been the subject of an extensive academic 78 debate. This debate has seen many supporters of free competition making an exception 79 when it comes to money (Friedman, 1960) , whereas advocates of free currency competi-80 tion (notably, Hayek, 1976 and and Rockoff, 1975) have been somewhat isolated.
81
In spite of this, the relatively recent reappraisal of the self-regulating properties of free 82 banking has raised new interest in the study of currency competition. The problem of time inconsistency of monetary policies has been studied exten-84 sively since Calvo (1978) , 3 but with the partial exceptions of Klein (1974) and Taub
85
(1985), the currency competition argument has not been considered. Klein understood 86 that the problem of currency competition could not be studied independently of the 87 2 See, for example, Calomiris and Kahn (1996) , King (1983) , and Rolnick and Weber (1983) . See also White (1993) at a case with a one-period commitment, which is also inefficient, even in the limit, as
103
 goes to infinity. In our set up, a one-period commitment is all that would be needed 104 in order to achieve efficient outcomes. We consider an economy with a representative household drawing utility from a single consumption good   and disutility from work effort
where  is increasing, concave, and satisfies the Inada condition lim →0  0 () = +∞;
furthermore,  (0) = 0.  is a positive constant. The technology is linear in labor, with a unitary coefficient, so
The consumption good is produced by perfectly competitive firms. Therefore, the price 141 of the consumption good in terms of labor will be one.
142
We assume that consumers must buy the consumption good with a composite of the 143 continuum of all possible differentiated currencies. This composite money aggregate is 144 defined as
where ()  is the real value of type  money, used for transactions at time . The 146 currencies are imperfect substitutes, but we consider imperfect substitutability only 147 as a methodological device to study the limiting economy where substitutability is 148 arbitrarily large. In the limit, each of the currencies has general purchasing power.
149
This model is a natural framework for analyzing Hayek's (1976) conjecture that money 150 can be supplied efficiently by the market.
151
The representative consumer maximizes utility subject to the following budget con-152 straint:
where ()  is the price of currency  in units of the consumption good and ()  is the 154 quantity of money , held from time  − 1 to time , and used for transactions at time 
where
The cash-in-advance constraint is
Let () +1 be the gross nominal interest rate from time  to  + 1 on currency ,
, and let
Then, the first order conditions of the consumer's problem imply
together with (7), which is binding for  ≥ 1, when    1, for  ≥ 1.
163
We now describe the problem of a currency issuer. The flow of funds for the issuer 164 of currency  is given by
where () +1 is the debt, Π()  are the profits, and () 0 and () 0 are both given.
166
The issuer also faces a no-Ponzi game condition guaranteeing that the present value 167 budget constraint is well defined. The present value of profits is
3 Equilibria with commitment
169
A monetary policy for the -currency issuer consists of an initial currency price and a 170 sequence of future nominal interest rates,
).
171
In order to maximize the present value of profits (8), firms must choose
taking the demand for currency (7) as given. Optimality also requires that the real (7); that is,
results in
To see this, notice that the derivative of the function (9) above is
which is always negative. Since the nominal interest rate cannot be negative, the
advance constraint does not have to hold with equality. But   =   is still a solution
179
to the households' problem. This corresponds to a stationary finite level of real money
This equilibrium allocation, from  ≥ 1, is the efficient one, 5 since the allocation 182 that maximizes utility (1) subject only to the production technology (2) is characterized
The equilibrium allocation from period one onward is efficient independently of the 185 elasticity of substitution across the competing currencies because money is costless to 186 4 This is a technical assumption that allows us to deal with infinite price levels and also with the infinite growth rates of those prices. 5 Notice that consumption in period  = 0 is zero,  0 = 0, which obviously is not efficient.
produce. If we were to consider a constant per-unit cost
of maintaining the stock 187 of real money ()  () +1 , the flow of funds of the currency issuer would be
The present value of profits would be as in (8), except that ()  is replaced by
The choice for the nominal interest rate would be
The nominal interest rate, ()  −1, would be equal to the markup  times the marginal 189 cost . The markup  is determined by the substitutability of the currencies. The
190
closer  is to one, the higher is the degree of substitutability. As currency substitution
191
increases, that is, as  approaches one nominal interest rates,
covering the production cost of real money.
193
As the cost of providing money, , is made arbitrarily close to zero, the price charged
194
for it, being a constant markup over marginal cost, is also close to zero. This is the case will hold with equality, resulting in
Profits can then be written as
The optimal solution will be to set  0  0 = 0, and choose a constant
This inequality is required because there could be a corner solution where  = 0.
so that there is a distortion even with  = 0, which is larger the lower is the price
7 This is the case that is consistent with our assumption that  (0) = 0. 8 Notice that we can define a demand for aggregate money implicitly as  0 () = . 1() is the elasticity of real money with respect to the gross nominal interest rate. 
Thus, if given the option at time  of revising the time 0 plan, the currency issuer will 219 find it optimal to let ()  ()  be zero. Although the real money demand is decreasing 220 in the nominal interest rate (i.e., in the expected future price level), once consumers 221 have made their currency decisions, the nominal money demand is predetermined and 222 therefore is rigid with respect to the current price level.
223
The real value of the outstanding money balances ()  ()  is set to zero through 224 an initial big open market operation in which currency () +1 is issued in an arbitrar-
225
ily large amount and lent to the households. 9 Each currency issuer takes a negative 226 position in bond holdings in an amount equal to the real quantity of money. In this 227 way the currency issuer is able to eliminate its outstanding liabilities and reissue the 228 money stock.
229
What is the seigniorage revenue when the value of outstanding currency is set to zero? For a constant nominal interest rate ()  =  (),  ≥  + 1, the expression for seigniorage revenue is
In every period, the issuer of currency receives the nominal interest rate times the real 9 See Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004, p. 870), for a description of the large open market operation. An alternative interpretation, offered by Taub (1985, pp. 200, 202) , is one of a currency reform. quantity of money. Suppose now that the value of outstanding currency is not set to zero, but that it is equal to the stationary level of real balances  (). Then, again for a constant nominal interest rate ()  =  (),  ≥  + 1, seigniorage revenue is
In this case seigniorage revenue is zero when stationary inflation is zero; in the case rate is positive, but they are negative from there on.
239
The efficient equilibrium with full commitment is supported with negative inflation; 
), in the extended reals:
Firms maximize short-run profits by setting an arbitrarily large price,  ()  , cor- 
Currency issuers choose
), except for the first period where
is not defined. 10 Histories are given by
where   is a density function on  + , such that   ( −1 ;
) is the density of
Consumers behave competitively, deciding according to the allocation rule
beliefs about future decisions of the currency issuers-and the corresponding prices,
) denotes the assessed density of the ex post interest rate
Note that given a history, choosing the price of the currency at time  is equivalent to choosing the ex post nominal interest rate.
11 Since issuers decide on () 0 before consumers make any decision, there is no need to introduce mixed strategies into that decision.
Rational expectations require that beliefs are consistent with currency issuers strate- In what follows, we restrict our attention to symmetric equilibria in the sense that 273 all firms behave the same way in equilibrium.
274
We first consider an equilibrium where strategies do not depend on histories. If the . The issuers can guarantee themselves this payoff independently 280 of consumer beliefs. In fact, notice that the present value of profits can be written as In this worst SCCE, no issuer is ever trusted to provide high-quality money. This 290 would be the unique outcome if issuers were anonymous players, not accountable for 291 their past decisions.
292
We now check whether a stationary gross nominal interest rate,  = (), is sus-293 tainable as an SCCE. In order to check this, we consider the standard trigger strategies 294 of reverting to the worst SCCE strategies, which in our context should be understood The value of the outcome after the deviation is zero, except for the value of the outstanding real debt, bacuse the deviation triggers a currency collapse for that currency, starting tomorrow. The demand for money, being an asset, depends on future prices. Thus, the expectations of the currency collapse render the newly injected money worthless today. Therefore, the present value of the benefits following a deviation is obtained by replacing the real value of money from time  on by zeros in the expression for profits (12),
On the other hand, if the issuer does not deviate, the present value of the profits
The last equality follows from the fact that, in equilibrium,
follows that the -currency issuer will choose not to deviate when
, the condition is satisfied, whenever
The proposition follows. is the additional revenue given by the new issuance of money at the rate of inflation.
320
Inflation must therefore be positive and the nominal interest rate must be higher than 321 the real, to guarantee positive profits in each period .
322
Proposition 2 has two implications. The first is that sustainable equilibria are The discount rate  does not affect the condition on inflation for sustainability,
335
but it does affect the efficiency of the lowest inflation equilibrium. The lower  is, the into account, then the issuer will always want to act on the zero elasticity, and the only 369 equilibrium is one where money has no value. Beliefs about future actions, because 370 future profits can be high enough, may discipline the issuer of currency, and there 371 could be equilibria where actual inflation is not arbitrarily large. This mechanism is 372 independent of the elasticity of substitution for future holdings, and therefore, in our 373 framework, it is independent of competition.
374
We make these points in a version of the Dixit-Stiglitz model of monopolistic com- 14 In a related literature (see Phelps and Winter , 1970 , Diamond, 1971 , Bils, 1989 , and Nakamura and Steinsson, 2011) firms face different short-and long-run elasticities, possibly because of habits. In such a context, firms' decisions are also time inconsistent. However, because the short-run elasticity is not zero, as it is in our case, the short-run elasticity will matter for the characterization of equilibria without commitment.
15 Clearly, this model does not capture all the features that currency competition entails; for example, there are interesting issues regarding competing currencies as means of exchange. affect the commitment results. In our model, because money is costless to produce, currency competition results in an efficient outcome even if currencies are not perfect 384 substitutes. This result is also particular to the monopolistic competition framework.
385
Instead, without commitment, as it turns out, the results are quite general. What-386 ever is the form of competition, the elasticity of the outstanding money balances will 387 always be zero, and the demands for future money holdings will be a function of to- 
392
Regardless of future elasticities or strategic interactions, there will always be an 393 equilibrium where the issuers will take into account only the short-run gains, resulting 394 in beliefs that will not sustain valued money. This will be the worst sustainable equi- 
401
In any sustainable equilibrium, the issuers must make positive profits out of cur-402 rency issuance. In our model, the number of firms is exogenous. However, in a model of currency, firms supplied final goods also under monopolistic competition. Assume producers have, at any time, the option of producing either high-quality goods-at 432 some unitary cost-or "fake" units of the consumption good that are costless to produce 433 and deliver no utility to the buyer. A key assumption for the characterization of the 434 equilibria is whether consumers can distinguish the high-quality goods from the low-435 quality ones before they buy them.
436
If the quality of the goods is perfectly observable before buying, the equilibrium 437 is uniquely determined: the price chosen by each monopolist is determined by the 438 elasticity of substitution. As goods become closer substitutes, the equilibrium outcome 439 becomes more efficient. It is Pareto efficient in the limiting case of perfect substitution.
440
In sum, the Bertrand competition argument holds.
441
Imagine, instead, that the quality is only observed with a lag. In a dynamic econ- in making the quality of outstanding money arbitrarily low). In both models, the 465 timing is very important: consumers purchase services before they observe the quality 466 they yield in one, and they purchase currencies before they observe the real return Expectations based on promises, however, may not be automatically fulfilled, be-494 cause suppliers may not be able to commit to maintaining future prices to achieve the 495 promised returns. In this context, it must be in the interest of suppliers to be trust-496 worthy: future rewards must compensate the temptation to renege on their promises.
497
The need for such future rewards determines a lower bound on the degree of efficiency 498 that can be achieved in these markets. In a currency market, the lower bound requires The previous result has a second, somewhat disturbing, corollary. Once the trust 504 mechanism works, it fully determines which equilibrium is achieved, and since beliefs 505 17 Subject to the caveat of footnote 6. sustaining trust are fairly arbitrary, there is an indeterminacy of such equilibria. That 506 is, any positive inflation can be part of a stationary equilibrium outcome.
507
In summary, competition and trust are two disciplinary mechanisms that can en-508 hance efficiency, and one would think that they should be mutually reinforcing. We 509 have seen that this may not be the case in a model of currency competition. With com-510 mitment, competition plays a role, but trust does not (it is automatically satisfied); 511 without commitment, trust plays a role, but competition does not. In the former case, 512 currency competition guarantees efficiency, independently of substitutability because 513 currencies are costless to produce. In the latter, the trust mechanism sets a lower 514 bound on inflation and the efficient outcome cannot be achieved. 
